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I.  INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance concerns the systems by which companies
are directed and controlled.1  The topic should not be studied in
isolation within any one country.  Instead, corporate governance is
becoming an important issue in all industrial economies, and students
of the topic need to be aware of what is occurring outside their
respective countries.2  As trade barriers fall, markets expand,
information flows improve, and restrictions on investment disappear,
it will become progressively easier for investors of one country to
invest in corporations in another.  Movement towards a worldwide
capital market could in turn have a substantial impact on corporate
governance in individual countries.  In a world with intense
Copyright © 2000 by Brian R. Cheffins.
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This is a revised version of a paper presented at a conference on financial markets and
institutional investors held in Naples in November 1999 by the Faculty of Law, Second
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1. See COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ¶
2.5 (1992) [hereinafter CADBURY REPORT]; THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ¶ 1.15 (1998) [hereinafter
HAMPEL REPORT]; DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 9 (1998).  For further background on the definition of corporate
governance, see Kevin Keasey et al., Introduction: The Corporate Governance Problem—
Competing Diagnoses and Solutions, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ECONOMIC,
MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 1, 2 (Kevin Keasey et al. eds., 1997) (stressing that the
term “corporate governance” is often used inconsistently).
2. See Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch, Preface to COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS, at v (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997);
Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom: Lessons for Canada, 28
CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 69, 69 (1997).
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competition for global savings, sophisticated investors will be
attracted to jurisdictions in which investment structures serve
shareholders’ interests.3  Since the attractiveness of a particular
locality will depend on its system of corporate governance,4 local
norms may be adjusted to make domestic markets more
accommodating to global trends.5
Events taking place in Britain merit the attention of those who
wish to learn more about how companies should be directed and
controlled.  An American academic observed in an article published
in 1998 that “the process by which British businesses have addressed
the problems of governance have a singularly appealing character.”6
Studies carried out by investment advisers indicate that the corporate
governance framework adopted in the United Kingdom is more
stringent and highly developed than those in other European markets
and elsewhere around the world.7  Moreover, the topic of corporate
governance has preoccupied much debate in Britain over the past few
years.8  There has been a great amount of commentary in the press
and a trilogy of committees—Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel—
have reviewed aspects of the problem.9  The work which has been
done in the United Kingdom has spurred reviews of corporate
governance in markets around the world and has provided a yardstick
against which investment frameworks in other countries are
measured.10
3. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 270-71 (1995).
4. See Erik Berglöf, Reforming Corporate Governance: Redirecting the European Agenda,
24 ECON. POL’Y 93, 93 (1997); see also Sir Adrian Cadbury, Postscript, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE & CORPORATE CONTROL 391, 393 (Saleem Sheikh & William Rees eds., 1995);
Joseph Sargent, Governance Goes Global, GLOBAL FIN., Nov. 1997, at 16 (“A superior
governance profile increasingly provides the honey that investor bees are seeking.”).
5. See Mary E. Kissane, Global Gadflies: Applications and Implementations of U.S.-Style
Corporate Governance Abroad, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 621, 672-73 (1997).
6. Jayne W. Barnard, The Hampel Committee: A Transatlantic Critique, 19 COMPANY
LAW. 110, 111 (1998).
7. See Sargent, supra note 4; Jean-Nicholas Caprasse & Shervin Setareh, Dèminor
Corporate Governance Survey, 9 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 126 (1998); Higher Corporate Governance
Standards Can Increase Returns, Study Claims, 11 INT’L SEC. REG. REP., Feb. 12, 1998, available
in LEXIS, News Library (discussing a study carried out by a Brussels based consulting group).
8. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 1.1.
9. See Gerard McCormack, Institutional Shareholders and the Promotion of Good
Corporate Governance, in THE REALM OF COMPANY LAW: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS IN
HONOUR OF PROFESSOR LEONARD SEALY, S.J. BERWIN PROFESSOR OF CORPORATE LAW AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE 131, 131 (Barry Rider ed., 1998).
10. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 1.5; Kissane, supra note 5, at 644; Bob Tricker,
Cadbury Revisited, 3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 59, 59-60
(1995).
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Since recent developments in the United Kingdom are important
from a corporate governance perspective, this Article will analyze
them in some detail.  As background, the opening section will discuss
the legal regime that applies to British companies and will describe
the key factors that shape corporate governance in the United
Kingdom.  Next, this Article will identify problems that affect the
management and control of British public companies.  This will be
followed by a summary of the solutions proposed by the Cadbury,
Greenbury, and Hampel panels.  There will then be an assessment of
the impact of the work of these three committees and a description of
corporate governance themes that are likely to attract attention in the
near future.
While, from a global perspective, good reasons exist for
considering the current debate over corporate governance in the
United Kingdom, the presence of differing market conditions must be
considered.  Companies with shares quoted for trading on London’s
Stock Exchange generally do not have a dominant shareholder.  In
contrast, ownership by a dominant shareholder is common in public
companies in most other countries, including many with highly
developed economies, such as Germany, France, Italy, and Canada.11
The existence of a concentrated ownership structure has a profound
impact on corporate governance.  When public companies have
controlling shareholders, the position of the minority becomes a
primary source of concern, and probably deserves a higher priority
than managerial accountability, the issue that has attracted the most
attention in the United Kingdom.
The situation in Italy illustrates the foregoing points.  The
corporate governance debate that has taken place in the United
Kingdom should be relevant in an Italian context because the two
countries are both member states in the European Union and because
they have economies of a similar size. 12  Still, since Italy is a country
where concentrated ownership of public companies is prevalent,
those who are interested in reforming Italian corporate governance
may well learn more by studying how similarly situated countries
have dealt with minority shareholder protection.  The Canadian
experience is particularly instructive because the country’s minority
shareholders have a wide range of remedies available to them.  We
will therefore consider whether reforms adopted in Canada might be
11. See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491-
95 (1999).
12. See WHITAKER’S ALMANACK 1999, at 771 (131st ed. 1998).
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suitable for export.  Since we will focus on developments affecting
public companies in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada, this
Article will take us from London to Milan, the home of Italy’s stock
exchange, via Toronto, the location of Canada’s leading stock
market.13
II.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING BRITISH
COMPANIES: AN OVERVIEW
In Britain, the vast majority of companies are incorporated under
the Companies Act 1985.14  The Act creates a distinction between
private companies and public limited companies.15  Only a tiny
fraction of companies incorporated in Britain are registered as public
limited companies.16  Nevertheless, from a corporate governance
perspective, they are of primary importance.  A private company
cannot apply to have its equity traded on a stock exchange, and
debates about corporate governance in the United Kingdom have
focused almost exclusively on companies that are publicly quoted.17
In the United Kingdom, most public companies that have their
shares quoted for trading have been admitted to the Official List
maintained by the Stock Exchange and are known as “listed”
companies.18  A listed company is obliged to comply with the Listing
Rules of London’s Stock Exchange (commonly referred to as the
“Yellow Book”).19  The Yellow Book regulates the conduct of key
transactions and imposes substantial disclosure obligations on listed
companies.20  If a listed company breaches a provision of the Yellow
13. On Italy’s stock market, see R.S. Karmel, Italian Stock Market Reform, N.Y. L.J., Aug.
20, 1998, at 3.  On Toronto’s situation, see Spotlight on Toronto, INVESTOR REL., May 1998, at
71.
14. See Companies Act 1985, Ch. 6 (Eng.).  See PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF
MODERN COMPANY LAW 3-7, 44-53 (6th ed., 1997).
15. See Companies Act 1985, §§ 1(3), 25, 27(1) (Eng.).
16. See DAVIES, supra note 14, at 13.
17. See Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, § 143 (addressing the listing of shares by private
companies); see also DAVIES, supra note 14, at 425-26.  On the link between corporate
governance reform and listed companies, see CADBURY REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 3.1; THE
STUDY GROUP ON DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: REPORT OF
A STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR RICHARD GREENBURY ¶ 1.4 (1995) [hereinafter
GREENBURY REPORT].
18. See JOHN H. FARRAR & BRENDA HANNIGAN, FARRAR’S COMPANY LAW 541-43 (4th
ed. 1998).  Farrar and Hannigan also describe the Alternative Investment Market, a market for
smaller, growing companies launched by the Stock Exchange in 1995.  See id.
19. See id. at 541.
20. See id. at 490, 542.
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Book, the Stock Exchange is entitled to publicize the infraction and,
if necessary, can suspend trading of the company’s shares.21
The Yellow Book plays a crucial role with respect to corporate
governance.  In 1998, the Stock Exchange amended its listing rules by
appending a document entitled “Principles of Good Governance and
Code of Best Practice;” this document, otherwise known as the
“Combined Code,” embraces work carried out by the Cadbury,
Greenbury, and Hampel Committees.22  The Yellow Book does not
oblige listed companies to comply with the principles set out in the
Combined Code.  Instead, a company is only required to discuss in its
annual report to shareholders and its annual accounts the extent to
which it has followed the relevant guidelines and to explain any
significant failures to comply.23  The objective of the exercise is to
secure sufficient disclosure so that investors and others can assess a
listed company’s corporate governance practices and respond in an
informed manner.24
British companies have corporate constitutions composed of two
documents: the memorandum of association and articles of
association.25  In the ordinary course, a company’s articles of
association vests the authority to manage the business in the hands of
the board of directors and gives the shareholders the power to choose
who sits on the board.26  Though the directors of a U.K. public
company are authorized to run the company, they usually do not
carry out day-to-day corporate decision-making activity.  Instead,
pursuant to a clause in the articles of association, the board delegates
its powers to individuals holding executive offices with the company.27
21. See Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, §§. 145, 153 (Eng.); THE STOCK EXCHANGE,
LISTING RULES ¶¶ 1.5, 1.19, 1.22 (1999).
22. See The Combined Code, preamble ¶ 1, in THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES
(1999).
23. See THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES ¶ 12.43A(a) (1999); The Combined Code,
preamble ¶¶ 4, 5, in THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).
24. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 1.25.
25. Section 14 of the Companies Act 1985 specifically states that these documents
constitute a contract that binds a company and its shareholders.  See Companies Act 1985 § 14
(Eng.).
26. See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 61,
95 (1997); Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985, S.I. 1985, No. 805, tbl. a, arts. 70, 73.
Section 303 of the Companies Act 1985 authorizes a company’s shareholders to remove a
director before his or her term has expired.
27. See Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985, S.I. 1985, No. 805, tbl. a, arts. 72, 84.
Many companies have a committee of managers which is vested with authority to deal with
operational issues.  See THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK ¶ 1.2 (R.A. Derwent ed.,
1996).
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The full-time executives then make the decisions regarding hiring and
firing, assigning work, launching product lines, setting prices, and
other important managerial matters.
In a typical U.K. listed company, a number of senior full-time
executives sit on the board, joining a group of “outside” or “non-
executive” directors who are not involved with the affairs of the
company on a day-to-day basis.28  Outside directors fulfill two key
functions.29  First, they provide full-time executives with support and
assistance as they carry out their managerial tasks.  For example, they
may offer advice on the basis of special expertise or foster links with
other organizations.  Second, they monitor executive decision-
making.  This involves reviewing the performance of management to
ensure that those in charge are acting in the shareholders’ interests
and are complying with the legal duties, regulatory requirements, and
ethical imperatives associated with the operation of a public
company.
Non-executive directors, in their capacity as corporate monitors,
are expected to play an important corporate governance role in
British publicly quoted companies.  Nevertheless, U.K. company law
does not recognize non-executives as a separate class of director.
Although some allowances may be made for differences in knowledge
and experience, all directors owe the same legal duties and are
equally responsible for decisions taken by the entire board.30
The legal obligations placed on directors arise by virtue of a
combination of case law principles and statutory provisions. The
United Kingdom uses its case law to define directors’ core legal duties
and its statutory law to provide a vehicle to further administer those
broadly defined obligations.  British case law dictates that directors
have an obligation to act in their companies’ best interests, to avoid
conflicts of interest, and to carry out their duties with care, skill, and
28. See CHEFFINS, supra note 26, at 96; THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK,
supra note 27, ¶ 2.2; Ken Peasnell et al., A New Model Board, ACCOUNTANCY INT’L, July 1998,
at 91.
29. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 3.8; THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
HANDBOOK, supra note 27, ¶¶ 1.11, 2.2; ROBERT I. TRICKER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: TEXT, READINGS AND CASES 148-50 (1994).
30. See Dorchester Fin. Co., Ltd. v. Stebbing [1989] B.C.L.C. 498 (Ch. 1977); RICHARD
SMERDON, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 37, 52 (1998); Colin Mercer,
Non-Executive Directors: Watchdogs, Oracles or Fall-Guys, PRACTICAL L. FOR COMPANIES,
June 1992, at 15, 16-17.  The Hampel Committee recommended that the law should remain the
same “in the interests of the unity and cohesion of the board.”  HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1,
¶ 3.3.
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diligence.31  On the statutory front, the Companies Act 1985 provides
for more than 200 punishable offences for directors.32  Directors can
also face sanctions under a wide range of other statutes, including the
Insolvency Act 1986 and environmental protection measures.33
III.  FACTORS THAT SHAPE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Considering the factors that shape Britain’s system of corporate
governance helps one to understand the trends which have emerged.
This is because corporate governance arrangements in any one
country are, to a significant extent, a product of the local economic
and social environment.34  A distinctive feature of the British
corporate governance system is that the environment in which its
public companies operate strongly resembles that which exists in the
United States.
An important similarity is the presence of well-developed equity
markets.  Almost all of America’s largest corporations are quoted on
the stock market, as are most major British companies.35  As of 1996,
the United Kingdom had thirty-six listed companies per one million
people and the United States had thirty, whereas France had eight,
Germany had five, and Italy had four.36  That same year, the market
capitalization of U.S. stock markets (the total market value of all of
the shares of all corporations listed for trading) was around 95% of
the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and in Britain the
31. See, e.g., In re Smith & Fawcett, Ltd. [1942] Ch. 304 at 306 (C.A. 1942); Aberdeen Rly.
Co. v. Blaikie Bros. (1854) 1 Macq. 461 at 471-72 (H.L., 1854); Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver
[1942] 1 All ER 378 (H.L., 1942) and City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. [1925] 1 Ch. 407 (Ch.D.,
1925).
32. See NIGEL G. MAW ET AL., MAW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 19-20 (1994);
Companies Act 1985, ch. 6, sched. 24.
33. See Insolvency Act 1986, ch. 45, §§ 213-214.  On other statutory measures, see
discussion by MAW ET AL., supra note 32, at 19-20, 99-107; P. SOUSTER, DIRECTORS: YOUR
RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES 25-26, 30-34 (4th ed. 1998).
34. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 1.4.
35. See Pieter W. Moerland, Alternative Disciplinary Mechanisms in Different Corporate
Systems, 26 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 17, 19 (1995); Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate
Ownership and Control in the UK, Germany, and France, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON OF THE US, JAPAN, AND
EUROPE 281, 283 (Donald H. Chew ed., 1997) [hereinafter STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS].
36. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131,
1137-38 (1997).
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proportion was even higher (approximately 135% of GDP).  In other
major European countries, the equivalent figure was 35% or less.37
Another common feature in the United Kingdom and the United
States is diffused share ownership.  In Britain, very few large
companies are controlled by families, and fewer than one-fifth of the
country’s publicly quoted firms have an owner who controls more
than twenty-five percent of the shares.38  Likewise, in the United
States, large shareholdings, and especially majority ownership, are
uncommon.39  An additional similarity between Britain and the
United States is that institutional investors, such as pension funds,
insurance companies, and mutual funds (known in the United
Kingdom as investment or unit trusts), play an important role in the
ownership of listed companies.  In the United States, institutional
investors own approximately fifty percent of the equity market.40  In
the United Kingdom, the figure is between sixty and seventy
percent.41
The structure of ownership and control in the United Kingdom
and the United States has been characterized as an “outsider” or
“arm’s-length” system.42  The “outsider” typology is used because
share ownership is dispersed among a large number of institutional
37. See Eddy Wymeersch, A Status Report on Corporate Governance Rules and Practices in
Some Continental European States, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE
OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 1045, 1057, 1061 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998); see
also Le Défi Américain, Again, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1996, at 21.  La Porta offers similar
evidence, though the method of calculation is somewhat different.  See La Porta et al., supra
note 36, at 1137-38.
38. See Berglöf, supra note 4, at 101; Wymeersch, supra note 37, at 1170-72; Paul L. Davies,
Institutional Investors as Corporate Monitors in the UK, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 48; S. Thomsen & T. Pedersen,
Nationality and Ownership Structures: The 100 Largest Companies in Six European Nations, 36
MGMT. INT’L REV. 149, 150 (1996).
39. See La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 493, 497; Andrew Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A
Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 754 (1997); P. Someshwar Rao & Clifton R.
Lee-Sing, Governance Structure, Corporate Decision-Making and Firm Performance in North
America, in CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA 43, 47 (Ronald J. Daniels & Randall
Morck eds., 1995).
40. See Rao & Lee-Sing, supra note 39, at 50; Richard Waters, Large Investors’ Power
Stalls, FIN. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at 25.
41. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 5.1; CHEFFINS, supra note 26, at 51; MONKS &
MINOW, supra note 3, at 303.
42. See Erik Berglöf, A Note on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 151, 152, 157-64; Colin Mayer, The City and
Corporate Performance: Condemned or Exonerated?, 21 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 291, 298-99
(1997); MARC GOERGEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: A
STUDY OF GERMAN AND UK INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 1-2 (1998).
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and individual investors, rather than being concentrated in the hands
of a small number of families, banks, or other firms.  The term
“arm’s-length” signifies that investors in the United States and the
United Kingdom are rarely poised to intervene or take a hand in
running a business.  Instead, they tend to maintain their distance and
give executives significant managerial discretion.
To understand why shareholders in the United Kingdom and the
United States tend to treat their investment in a company in an arm’s-
length manner, it is helpful to consider the position of a typical
institutional investor.  Most often, an institution will own equity in a
large number of companies and thus will have a highly diversified
portfolio of shares.  Under such circumstances, participating in the
affairs of any one firm is unlikely to be worthwhile; the impact on the
overall value of its share portfolio will probably be trivial.  Also, the
presence of an “exit option” is important.  If a company is poorly run,
taking advantage of the liquidity the stock market offers by selling the
equity could offer a much quicker and less costly solution than trying
to turn things around by acting in a “hands-on” manner.43  As the next
part of this article will show, the detached approach that shareholders
tend to take has had a pivotal influence on discussions of corporate
governance in both the United Kingdom and the United States.
IV.  THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL:
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, a highly
influential book published in the early 1930s, Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means drew attention to the arm’s length approach to
investment that is a characteristic of British and American equity
markets.44  The authors asserted that while the law treated
shareholders as a company’s owners, investors in public corporations
usually did not act in the manner one would expect of an owner.
43. For further details on why institutional investors might be reluctant to take on an
activist role, see CHEFFINS, supra note 26, at 62-64; JONATHAN CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD
COMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 206-8, 280-91 (1994);
Helen Short & Kevin Keasey, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: RESPONSIBILITIES, RISKS AND REMUNERATION 23, 25-27 (Kevin
Keasey & Mike Wright eds., 1997); see also HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 5.2.
44. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).  On the book’s impact, see Davies, supra note 38, at 49; Edward B. Rock,
America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367,
368-70 (1996).
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Instead, shareholders allowed management to deal with matters of
importance, resulting in a separation of ownership and control.
In the years after Berle and Means outlined their separation of
ownership and control thesis, many commentators bemoaned the
passivity of shareholders.45  Giving executives the freedom to run a
widely held public company, however, is in many respects a sensible
division of labor.  Theoretically, the individuals hired as senior
managers should have the training, experience, and abilities necessary
to be effective corporate decision-makers.  They should also have
ample time to become familiar with the operations of the company on
behalf of which they act.  Moreover, a company’s top managerial
personnel should constitute a sufficiently small and cohesive group to
allow for effective decision-making.46
While executives in a widely held public company typically
should be well positioned to act in a managerial capacity,
shareholders are unlikely to be well suited for a hands-on role.  It is
not feasible for all who own equity to be consulted on managerial
decisions since the delay would be costly, resulting in lost customers
and foregone opportunities.47  Most shareholders in widely held public
companies are not experienced business managers and cannot
properly substitute for them.48  Even those investors who can claim
managerial expertise are unlikely to be sufficiently acquainted with a
company to offer constructive solutions on questions executives have
to confront (e.g., resolving how to finance an expansion of the
business and determining which plants to build and close).49
Though delegating decision-making to an inner circle of
company executives offers important advantages, the arrangement is
not without its faults.  Typically, managers who work for widely held
British and U.S. corporations own a small percentage of the equity.50
45. See generally, e.g., David C. Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 22 (1963); LEWIS D. GILBERT, DIVIDENDS AND DEMOCRACY (1956).
46. See, e.g., MONKS & MINOW, supra note 3, at 99-100, 179; R.C. CLARK, CORPORATE
LAW 23-24 (1986).
47. See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 3, at 179.
48. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 1.19; see also Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 39, at
741; J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF
COMPANY LAW 51 (1993).
49. See C. MACKENZIE, THE SHAREHOLDER ACTION HANDBOOK: USING SHARES TO
MAKE COMPANIES MORE ACCOUNTABLE 60-61 (1993).
50. See Andy D. Cosh & Alan Hughes, The Changing Anatomy of Corporate Control and
the Market for Executives in the United Kingdom, 24 J.L. & SOC’Y 104, 118 (1997) (noting,
however, that the percentage of shares owned by directors in British companies was increasing);
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Since corporate executives receive only a tiny fraction of returns
derived from the profit-enhancing activities they engage in on behalf
of shareholders, they may be tempted to use their control over
corporate assets to further their own interests at the expense of those
who own equity.  To the extent that top managers pursue their own
agenda, they impose what economists refer to as “agency costs” on
these investors.51
The agency cost problem can manifest itself in a variety of ways.
Company executives can “shirk” their responsibilities by carrying out
more desirable activities (for example, playing golf or setting up
business ventures they want to pursue in their personal capacity).52
Alternatively, they might engage in “looting” or “diversion” of
corporate assets by constructing unnecessarily lavish offices, by
carrying out exotic “business” travel, by providing high-paying jobs to
family members, or by squandering funds on ill-conceived “pet”
projects.53  Moreover, senior executives might use their influence in
the boardroom to ensure that the board awards them overly generous
salaries and excessive bonuses.54  In addition, a corporation’s
managers might use their leverage to entrench themselves and
continue in office even if they are no longer competent or qualified to
run the business.55
While those acting in a managerial capacity in widely held
companies will be tempted to act in a self-serving manner, various
factors serve to align the interests of executives and shareholders.56
One is the labor market for executives—to impress potential
alternative employers, senior managers want to run companies well.
Another factor is the market for a company’s products or services—
executives will lose their jobs if a decline in market share is
sufficiently precipitous to cause the company to fail.  The capital
market is also significant—companies that want to raise money will
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But
How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138, 141, 144.
51. See Brian R. Cheffins, Michaud v. National Bank of Canada and Canadian Corporate
Governance: A Victory for Shareholder Rights?, 30 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 20, 25-26 (1998)
[hereinafter Canadian Corporate Governance].
52. See JOHN MCMILLAN, GAMES, STRATEGIES AND MANAGERS 98-99 (1992).
53. See J.S. ZIEGEL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PARTNERSHIPS AND CANADIAN
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 391-92 (3d ed. 1994).
54. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 39, at 745; Chris Riley & Diane Ryland, Directors’
Remuneration: Towards Some Principles of Substantive and Procedural Review, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE & CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 181, 182.
55. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 39, at 742-43.
56. See CHEFFINS, supra note 26, at 117-19.
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receive less advantageous terms if there is evidence of
mismanagement.  Moreover, there is the threat of a hostile takeover
bid, which occurs when a bidder makes an offer to the shareholders of
a target company to buy their equity with a view to installing new
executives.  Hostile takeovers are feasible in companies with a widely
dispersed ownership structure because bidders can acquire control on
the open market rather than by negotiating with a dominant
shareholder.57
Although various market instruments can serve to deter self-
serving managerial conduct in widely held companies, they do not
entirely eliminate agency cost problems.  Instead, those managing
widely held corporations retain some scope to pursue their own
agenda at the expense of shareholders.58  In the United Kingdom,
fears that top executives lead a privileged existence and have ample
scope to act in a misguided or dishonest manner have helped to bring
the topic of corporate governance to prominence in recent years.  The
process began with a spate of unexpected company failures and
financial scandals in the early 1990s, with the most spectacular
example involving the collapse of the business empire of controversial
press baron Robert Maxwell.59  Since low standards of managerial
accountability were identified as an important cause of these
incidents, concern grew about how British companies were being run.
Subsequently, a different complaint was heard, this being that
Britain’s executives were overpaid.  Executive remuneration
prompted heated debate in the United Kingdom in the 1990s, as the
media characterized the awarding of generous salaries and the
operation of lucrative share option schemes as examples of
57. See G.P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 228 (1996); cf. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 39, at 756.  On the extent of
takeover activity in the United Kingdom, see Wymeersch, supra note 37, at 1190-92.  Just how
effective the threat of a takeover is in disciplining management is controversial.  See, e.g.,
Mayer, supra note 42, at 297.
58. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 39, at 746-47; Michael C. Jensen, The Modern
Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 850-52
(1993); Jonathan R. Macey, Institutional Investors and Corporate Monitoring: A Demand-Side
Perspective in a Comparative View, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note
37, at 903, 907.
59. Other prominent examples included Polly Peck International plc, a food and consumer
electronics group, and Brent Walker plc, a property and leisure group.  See generally SMERDON,
supra note 30, at 1; C. Boyd, Ethics and Corporate Governance: the Issues Raised by the Cadbury
Report in the United Kingdom, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 167, 168 (1996).
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managerial “gluttony.”60  Concerns about low standards of managerial
accountability and rising executive pay levels were sufficiently serious
to provide the catalyst for the establishment of the trilogy of
committees—Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel—that reviewed
corporate governance in the United Kingdom in the 1990s.  We will
analyze the work done by these three panels after we have considered
in a general way possible solutions to the sort of corporate
governance problems likely to arise in widely held public companies.
V.  REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
AN OVERVIEW
Concerns about low standards of corporate governance have led
to much discussion about possible reform.  First, many of those who
fear that corporate executives are not sufficiently accountable for
their conduct have stressed that the board of directors can act as a
crucial corrective mechanism.  They posit that a company’s non-
executive directors can reduce agency costs by monitoring the
management team in a conscientious and objective manner.  Outside
directors are the logical candidates to act as managerial “watch-dogs”
because their independent status theoretically ensures that they will
have the detached perspective required to carry out supervisory tasks
effectively.61
The restructuring of executive pay schemes has been suggested
as a second method available for improving managerial
accountability.  A popular thesis is that remuneration levels should
fluctuate in accordance with shareholder return.62  The theory is that
executives need to be motivated to think like shareholders: if those
who run companies face the same risks and opportunities as those
who invest, they will have a direct incentive to do what is best for
investors.63  In publicly quoted British companies, fluctuations in
executive pay typically exhibit a weak correlation with changes in
shareholder return.64  It therefore follows that changes should be
60. See, e.g., David Cohen, Executive Gluttony Under Attack, FIN. TIMES, November 26/27,
1994, at 3; see also CHEFFINS, supra note 26, at 655-56; THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
HANDBOOK, supra note 27, ¶ 6.1.
61. See Canadian Corporate Governance, supra note 51, at 29.
62. See Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Palmer, CEO Pay: How Much is Enough?,
HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug., 1992, at 130, 137 (quoting comments of Nell Minow).
63. See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 3, at 238; Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.  Murphy,
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 225-26, 242-43 (1990).
64. See Martin J. Conyon & Paul Gregg, Pay at the Top: A Study of the Sensitivity of Top
Director Remuneration to Company Specific Shocks, NATIONAL INSTIT. ECON. REV., Aug.
CHEFFINS.DOC 03/27/00  8:32 PM
18 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 10:5
made to ensure that managerial remuneration packages are designed
to suit investors better.65
Third, many of those concerned about managerial agency costs
think that increasing the role of institutional investors as active
company owners will enhance accountability.66  Pension funds,
insurance companies, and other institutional investors allegedly do
little more than attempt to enhance the value of their share portfolios
by buying and selling equity in various companies.  It is felt that they
should forsake this “hands-off” approach and seek to improve the
performance of the companies in which they already own stock.  As a
key step, these large investors could promote good governance.
Doing so could potentially improve their rate of return because
companies are likely to be more profitable when those in charge are
held properly accountable.67  From a broader perspective, reuniting
ownership with responsibility will help to secure the continued
benefits of a healthy capitalist system.68
The foregoing proposals can function as complements rather
than alternatives.  Executive pay is instructive in this regard.  Various
advocates of corporate governance reform have argued that a
remuneration committee composed entirely of outside directors
should address executive pay issues.69  According to this theory, the
individuals sitting on the remuneration committee should have
sufficient time, resources, and expertise to consider all relevant
factors, and their detached perspective should allow them to
1994, at 83; Paul Gregg et al., The Disappearing Relationship Between Directors’ Pay and
Corporate Performance, 31 BRIT. J. IND. REL. 1, 3 (1993).  Typically the pattern has been the
same in the United States.  For example, see Jensen & Murphy, supra note 63.  Things,
however, appear to be changing.  See Brian J. Hall & Jeffery B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid
Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653 (1998).
65. On possible flaws with this line of reasoning, see CHEFFINS, supra note 26, at 685-87.
66. See, e.g., STAPLEDON, supra note 57, at 17-18, 207-12, 284-85; J.P. Charkham, A Larger
Role for Institutional Investors, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 99
(Nicholas Dimsdale & Martha Prevezer eds., 1994); Bermard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents:
the Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992).
67. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 235-36 (1994); Bernard S. Black, Institutional Investors and
Corporate Governance: The Case for Institutional Voice, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS, supra note 35, 160, 161.
68. See ROBERT A. G. MONKS, THE EMPEROR’S NIGHTINGALE: RESTORING THE
INTEGRITY OF THE CORPORATION 69, 162-64 (1998); S. WRIGHT, TWO CHEERS FOR THE
INSTITUTIONS 20-21, 68-69 (1994).
69. See Ian M. Ramsay, Directors’ and Officers’ Remuneration: The Role of the Law, 1993
J. BUS. L. 351, 373; Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation—A Board-Based Solution,
34 B.C. L. REV. 937, 939, 942-43 (1993).
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approach their task in an unbiased manner.  Moreover, institutional
investors may well have the leverage required to induce a
remuneration committee to carry out its assignment prudently and
diligently.  In a company where institutions own a majority of the
shares, they can potentially use their combined voting power to
determine who sits on the board.70  Directors serving on the
remuneration committee of such a company therefore have an
incentive to take into account institutional preferences regarding
executive pay.71  Assuming that institutional shareholders will support
linking pay with performance, this example illustrates that corporate
governance proposals which have been made can operate effectively
on an integrated, complementary basis.
VI.  IMPLEMENTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Corresponding to the recommendations for reform discussed
above, the corporate governance regime in the United Kingdom
evolved considerably during the 1990s.  The changes were primarily a
result of the work done by three committees, each of which is known
by the name of its chairman: Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel.  Sir
Adrian Cadbury’s Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance was established in 1991.72  The Committee was sponsored
by the accounting profession, the London Stock Exchange, and the
Financial Reporting Council, which supervises the setting of
accounting standards that apply to British companies.  The sponsors
established the Cadbury Committee because of two concerns—a low
level of confidence in the corporate financial reporting regime and
fears that auditor shortcomings were undermining the effectiveness of
companies’ internal control systems.73
In 1992, the Cadbury Committee set out its findings and
conclusions in a report (the “Cadbury Report”) accompanied by a
Code of Best Practice.74  Because auditing was seen as an important
topic by the Committee, the Cadbury Report considered how the
70. See CHEFFINS, supra note 26, at 61, 95 (discussing the authority which shareholders
have to select a company’s directors under U.K. law); JAMES D. COX, ET AL., CORPORATIONS §
9.12 (1995) (discussing removal of directors by shareholders under U.S. law).
71. See CHEFFINS, supra note 26, at 695.
72. See CADBURY REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2.1, 2.2., app. 1 (containing background
material).
73. See id.
74. The Cadbury Code of Best Practice is set out in the CADBURY REPORT, supra note 1,
at 58.
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professional objectivity of auditors could be preserved and canvassed
potential methods for increasing the effectiveness and value of
audits.75  The bulk of the Cadbury Report (and most of the guidelines
in the accompanying Code of Best Practice) focused, however, on the
role which the board of directors should play in supervising executive
decision making.  The Cadbury Committee’s stated philosophy was
that proper managerial accountability was the key to any system of
corporate governance.  Its view was that companies that adhered to
its Code of Best Practice would experience improvement on this
front.76
The Cadbury Committee declared that primary responsibility for
compliance with its Code of Best Practice lay with companies
themselves, via their boards of directors.77  Correspondingly, the
Cadbury Committee favored only one enforcement mechanism of a
legal character: a requirement that, as a continuing obligation of
listing on London’s Stock Exchange, companies publish a statement
of compliance with the Code.  Following publication of the Cadbury
Report, the Stock Exchange imposed such an obligation in its Yellow
Book.78
The Greenbury Committee, chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury,
also examined corporate managerial policy, but with a focus on
executive remuneration.  The Confederation of British Industry, an
organization representing the business community, established the
Greenbury Committee in 1995.79  Later that same year, the committee
issued its findings in a report (“the Greenbury Report”), together
with an accompanying Code of Best Practice.80  The Greenbury
Report recommended that in a publicly quoted company, a
remuneration committee composed of non-executive directors should
play a central and constructive role in setting executive pay.81  The
report also emphasized the importance of shareholder participation.
The Committee acknowledged that meaningful shareholder
involvement could only occur if investors had sufficient information
to determine whether a company’s approach to remuneration issues
75. See id. ¶¶ 5.1-5.48.
76. See id. ¶¶ 1.6-1.11.
77. See id. ¶ 3.14.
78. See THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES ¶ 12.43(j) (1999) (deleted January 1999).
79. On the history, see Cheffins, supra note 2, at 79.
80. See generally GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 17; Code of Best Practice, in
GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 13.
81. See GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 17, ¶¶ 1.14, 4.3, 4.8; Code of Best Practice ¶ A1,
in GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 13.
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was sound and to decide whether corrective action was required.  The
Greenbury Report correspondingly urged a “philosophy of full
transparency,” and made a series of recommendations designed to
foster enhanced disclosure.82
As with the Cadbury Committee, the Greenbury Committee did
not support the use of legislation as a means for implementing its
recommendations.83  Instead, the Greenbury panel advised that
companies themselves should take steps to address executive pay
issues.84  The Greenbury Committee did recommend, however, that
the Stock Exchange provide backing for various elements of the
Committee’s Code of Best Practice via the Exchange’s listing rules.85
The Stock Exchange agreed and implemented many of the
Greenbury Committee’s recommendations in amendments to the
Yellow Book.86
After the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees issued their
reports, the Committee on Corporate Governance was established,
with Sir Ronald Hampel as chair (the “Hampel Committee”).87  The
Hampel Committee’s primary assignment was to review the Cadbury
and Greenbury Reports, but it was also urged to consider the entire
spectrum of corporate governance.88  Hence, its task was “to promote
high standards of corporate governance in the interests of investor
protection and in order to preserve and enhance the standing of
companies listed on the Stock Exchange.”89
When the Hampel Committee issued its final report in 1998, it
identified a series of broad principles of good corporate governance
and presented a series of more detailed recommendations concerning
best practice.  The Stock Exchange then implemented many facets of
the Hampel Report by appending “the Combined Code” to the
Yellow Book.  The Combined Code is divided into two parts: the first
82. See id. ¶¶ 5.1-5.33.
83. Nevertheless, some minor legislative changes were made to implement the
Committee’s recommendations.  See The Company Accounts (Disclosure of Directors’
Emoluments) Regulations 1997, S.I. 1997, No. 570.
84. See GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 17, ¶¶ 1.13, 1.14.
85. See id. ¶¶ 1.19, 3.3.
86. The Stock Exchange did so by adding paragraphs 12.43(w) and 12.43(x), and an
appendix entitled Best Practice Provisions: Directors Remuneration to the Yellow Book.  These
provisions have now been deleted.  See THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES ¶ 12.43 (1999).
87. This was done pursuant to a suggestion of the Cadbury Committee. See CADBURY
REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 3.12.
88. See V. Younghusband, Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom, 9 INT’L CORP. &
COM. L. REV. 275, 275 (1998).
89. HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B.
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sets out general “Principles of Good Governance”, the second
presents a more detailed Code of Best Practice.90  The Combined
Code embraces not only the recommendations of the Hampel
Committee but also those made to the listing rules as a result of work
done by the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees.  Correspondingly,
it is now the definitive guide to corporate governance for companies
listed on the Stock Exchange.91
In addition to appending the Combined Code to its Yellow
Book, the Stock Exchange altered the main text of its listing rules by
adding a new provision.92  The new provision requires a listed
company to provide in its annual report and its annual accounts a
narrative statement which enables shareholders to evaluate how the
Combined Code’s Principles of Good Governance have been
applied.93  A company must also state whether it has complied with
specified provisions in the Code of Best Practice and explain any non-
compliance.94  In addition, a company’s board of directors must
provide shareholders with a report discussing the company’s policy on
executive remuneration and disclosing various specified items,
including the details of the elements of each director’s pay.95
As mentioned above, if executives are not sufficiently
accountable for their conduct, a possible solution is to prompt
company boards to step forward and do a proper job of supervising
and monitoring management.96  The Cadbury and Hampel
Committees both endorsed this thesis in their respective reports and
their recommendations on the matter are reflected in the contents of
90. The “Principles of Good Governance,” also called the “Combined Code Principles,”
are contained in Part 1 of the Combined Code.  See The Combined Code, Principles of Good
Governance, in THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).  The “Code of Best Practice,”
also called the “Combined Code of Best Practice” is contained in Part 2 of the Combined Code.
See The Combined Code, Code of Best Practice, in THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES
(1999).  See also Younghusband, supra note 88; Roger Davis, Cut Out the Boilerplate,
ACCOUNTANCY INT’L, Aug. 1998, at 69.
91. See SMERDON, supra note 30, at 16, 67; J. Gibbs & D. Tankel, Rewarding Executives:
Disclosure and Approval, PRACTICAL LAW FOR COMPANIES, Oct. 1998, at 31.
92. See THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES ¶ 12.43A (1999); Gibbs & Tankel, supra
note 91, at 32.
93. Companies are not required to discuss Section 2 of the Principles, which addresses
institutional investors.  See The Combined Code, Principles of Good Governance § 2(E), in THE
STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).
94. Companies are not required to discuss Section 2 of the Code, which addresses
institutional investors.  See The Combined Code, Code of Best Practice § 2(E), in THE STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).
95. See Gibbs & Tankel, supra note 91, at 35, 37 (discussing the contents of this report).
96. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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the current Combined Code. 97  For instance, the Principles of Good
Governance state that every listed company should be headed by an
effective board which will provide leadership and which will
safeguard the investment of the shareholders by maintaining a sound
system of internal control.98  Moreover, to ensure that no individual or
small group of individuals can dominate decision making, a
company’s board should be composed of a balance of executive and
non-executive directors.99
The Code of Best Practice supports the Principles of Good
Governance by stating that there should be a strong and independent
non-executive element on the board.100  More precisely, outside
directors should comprise not less than one-third of the board and a
majority of these non-executives should be “independent”, in the
sense that they are free from any relationship which could interfere
with the exercise of their judgment.101  Because of their independence,
a company’s outside directors should perform the pivotal role of
sitting on influential board committees.  For instance, the Code of
Best Practice states that a listed company should have an audit
committee composed of non-executive directors who review the work
of the company’s auditors to ensure that audits are done in an
objective and independent manner.102  Moreover, new directors
should be recruited by a nomination committee composed primarily
of non-executives to help ensure that the board will be structured to
meet desired standards of objectivity.103
Linking pay with performance has been suggested as another
method for addressing concerns about managerial agency costs.104
97. See CADBURY REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 4.5, 4.6; HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶
3.8.  The Hampel Committee did emphasize as well that outside directors make an important
contribution to the development of a company’s business strategy.
98. See The Combined Code, Principles of Good Governance, § 1(A)(1), in THE STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).
99. See id. § 1(A)(3).
100. See The Combined Code, Code of Best Practice § 1(A)(3), in THE STOCK EXCHANGE,
LISTING RULES (1999).
101. See id. § 1(A)(3)(1), (A)(3)(2). Empirical evidence suggests that in smaller listed
companies, non-executives often do not qualify as being fully independent.  See SMERDON,
supra note 30, at 61-62.
102. See The Combined Code, Code of Best Practice § 1(D)(3), in THE STOCK EXCHANGE,
LISTING RULES (1999); SMERDON, supra note 30, at 62, 133.
103. See The Combined Code, Code of Best Practice § 1(A)(5)(1), in THE STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999); SMERDON, supra note 30, at 56-57.
104. On the theory that linking pay with performance will reduce agency costs, see supra
note 63 and accompanying text.
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The Greenbury and Hampel Committees both agreed with this
diagnosis.  The Greenbury Committee stated that a company’s
remuneration policy should be structured to ensure that managerial
personnel share the interests of shareholders and want to see the
business succeed.105  The Hampel Committee said that a significant
part of an executive director’s remuneration should be linked to the
company’s performance.106  Moreover, the two Committees, in their
respective reports, both indicated that it is inappropriate for full-time
board executives to participate in decisions about their own
remuneration packages, and recommended that a remuneration
committee composed of outside directors should be responsible for
formulating a company’s policy on executive pay.107
The Combined Code implements important elements of the
findings of the Greenbury and Hampel Committees regarding
executive pay.  With respect to remuneration committees, one of the
Principles of Good Governance is that “no director should be
involved in deciding his or her own remuneration.”108  The Code of
Best Practice provides more detailed guidance on the same point,
instructing a company’s board of directors to establish a
remuneration committee consisting exclusively of non-executive
directors who are independent from management.109
Consistent with the thesis that executives should have financial
incentives to take shareholders’ interests into account, another
Principle of Good Governance is that “a proportion of executive
directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to
corporate and individual performance.”110  Similarly, the Code of Best
Practice provides that managerial remuneration schemes should be
designed to align the interests of executives with those of
shareholders and to give management incentives to perform at the
105. See GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 6.16.
106. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 4.6.
107. See GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 4.8; HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 4.12.
The Cadbury Committee expressed similar views.  See CADBURY REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 4.42.
108. The Combined Code, Principles of Good Governance § 1(B)(2), in THE STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).
109. See The Combined Code, Code of Best Practice § 1(B)(2)(1), (B)(2)(2), in THE STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).  As a practical matter, however, the remuneration
committee can expect to receive strong input from the company’s CEO.  See HAMPEL REPORT,
supra note 1, ¶ 4.11; SMERDON, supra note 30, at 63.
110. The Combined Code, Principles of Good Governance § 1(B)(1), in THE STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).
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highest levels.111  Further guidance on the proper design of
performance-related remuneration is provided in a schedule
appended to the Combined Code.112
Prompting institutional investors to consider seriously their
responsibilities as owners of companies may be an additional way to
improve managerial accountability.113  The Cadbury Report strongly
endorsed this line of reasoning, saying that shareholders should insist
on a high standard of corporate governance.114  Moreover, the
Cadbury Committee urged institutional investors to exchange views
regularly with senior executives of companies, to “make positive use
of their voting rights” at shareholder meetings, and to “take a positive
interest in the composition of boards of directors” by ensuring that
non-executives of the necessary caliber, experience, and
independence are appointed.115
The Hampel Committee acknowledged that after the publication
of the Cadbury Report, institutional investors had begun to take a
more activist approach to corporate governance.116  The Committee
suggested this was a healthy trend and, like the Cadbury Committee,
urged institutional investors to vote at shareholder meetings and
strongly supported ongoing dialogue between a company’s executives
and its institutional shareholders.117  The contents of the Combined
Code reflect, to a certain extent, the views expressed by the Cadbury
and Hampel Committees.  The Principles of Good Governance state
that institutional shareholders “have a responsibility to make
considered use of their votes.”118  Moreover, companies and the
institutions that own shares in them should be ready, where
111. See The Combined Code, Code of Best Practice § 1(B)(1)(4), in THE STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).
112. See The Combined Code, Schedule A, in THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES
(1999).  The schedule was derived from an appendix added to the Yellow Book in 1996 to
implement recommendations made by the Greenbury Committee.  The appendix was entitled
“Best Practice Provisions: Directors Remuneration, Section B: Remuneration Policy, Service
Contracts and Compensation.”
113. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
114. See CADBURY REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 6.6.
115. Id. ¶ 6.11.
116. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5.3, 5.5.
117. See id. ¶¶ 5.7, 5.10.  The Hampel Committee indicated, however, that executives and
investors should not be required to enter into a dialogue.  See id. ¶ 5.11.
118. The Combined Code, Principles of Good Governance § 2(E)(1), in THE STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).  Listed companies are not obliged to discuss principle
2(E)(2) when they provide a narrative statement of how they have applied the Combined Code
principles. See THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES ¶ 12.43A(a) (1999); supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
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practicable, to enter into a dialogue based on the mutual
understanding of objectives.119
VII.  ISSUES ARISING FROM THE WORK DONE BY THE
CADBURY, GREENBURY, AND HAMPEL COMMITTEES
While the Combined Code can now be thought of as the
definitive guide to corporate governance in the United Kingdom, this
does not mean that debate concerning the topic has ended.  Instead,
the work carried out by the Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel
Committees has raised various issues that are likely to generate
further discussion and analysis.  Although it is beyond the scope of
this Article to provide a detailed overview of all such matters, it will
highlight issues where substantial changes in approach could occur in
the foreseeable future.
One topic that has generated considerable debate is
enforcement.  The Combined Code does not have any direct statutory
backing.  The only applicable enforcement mechanism of a legal
character is a requirement that companies, as a continuing obligation
of listing on the Stock Exchange, describe how they have applied the
Combined Code’s Principles and discuss the extent to which they
follow the Code of Best Practice.120  The objective of this regime is not
to compel companies to comply with the Combined Code, but to
secure sufficient disclosure so that investors and others can assess a
listed company’s corporate governance practices and respond in an
informed way.121
Some critics are skeptical of the enforcement approach that
underpins the Combined Code.  They question whether the current
regime is likely to address problems of corporate governance
properly since compliance is not required by law.122  However, the
119. See The Combined Code, Principles of Good Governance § 1(C)(1), 2(E)(2), in THE
STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES (1999).  Listed companies are not obliged to discuss Section
2(E)(2) in the narrative statement they prepare on compliance with Combined Code Principles.
See THE STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING RULES ¶ 12.43A(a) (1999); supra note 93 and
accompanying text.  This Combined Code Principle was drawn from recommendations put
forward by a City/Industry Working Group chaired by Paul Myners (Developing a Winning
Partnership: How Companies and Institutional Investors are Working Together (1995)).  See
Younghusband, supra note 88, at 278.
120. See supra notes 24, 93 and 94 and accompanying text; Gibbs & Tankel, supra note 91.
121. See id.
122. See CHARKHAM, supra note 43, at 333-35, 341-42 (this author was a member of the
Cadbury Committee); Riley & Ryland, supra note 54, at 190-91; Jim Kelly et al., DTI Gives
Guarded Welcome Ahead of Review, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at 11 (quoting views expressed
by the Trades Union Congress).
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evidence concerning the Codes of Best Practice introduced by the
Cadbury and Greenbury Committees suggests that such fears are
misplaced.123  Admittedly, the guidelines in question did not foster a
complete transformation on the corporate governance front.
Nevertheless, because listed companies took seriously the
recommendations made by the two committees, the guidelines had a
noteworthy impact on corporate behavior.124
Because listed companies have paid attention to corporate
governance guidelines, it seems unlikely that wide-ranging statutory
intervention will occur, at least in the near future.  The Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI), which has primary control over
legislative initiatives concerning U.K. companies, announced in 1998
that it was carrying out a fundamental review of the framework of
core company law.125  In a discussion paper published to launch the
project, the DTI endorsed the approach to corporate governance
adopted by the Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel Committees,
saying that “the Government does not intend to replace the use of
best practice by legal rules.”126
Although the DTI spoke favorably of the current self-regulatory
regime in its 1998 discussion paper, its endorsement was a qualified
one.  The DTI said that changes would not occur so long as “best
practice is seen to be working.”127  Presumably, if evidence emerges
which suggests that the current regime is failing to have a sufficient
influence on corporate behavior, statutory intervention will be placed
back on the agenda.128  Indeed, the DTI specifically indicated in its
123. See Ben Pettet, The Stirring of Corporate Social Conscience: From “Cakes and Ale” to
Community Programmes, 50 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 279, 303 (1997).
124. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 1.10; Cheffins, supra note 2, at 83-86 (discussing
empirical studies).  For additional evidence indicating that the work done by the Cadbury and
Greenbury has had a significant influence on listed companies, see Peasnell et al., supra note 28;
Paul Collier, Audit Committees in Smaller Listed Companies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
RESPONSIBILITIES, RISKS, AND REMUNERATION, supra note 43, at 93; Robert Bruce, UK plc
Enjoys the Sweet Success of Cadbury Code, TIMES, Nov. 12, 1998; Andrew Verity, Incentive
Schemes Getting Tougher, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 15, 1999, 17.  Other studies are more pessimistic.
See Jason Nissé, Most Directors Fail to Meet Codes of Best Practice on Pay, TIMES (London),
Jan. 6, 1997, at 44; Jane Martinson, Half of Top Companies Failing to Comply with Hampel, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1998, at 12 (discussing companies which had failed to comply with a Hampel
Committee recommendation on disclosure of shareholder voting patterns).
125. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,  supra note 1.
126. Id. at 9.
127. See id.
128. See Ben Pettet, Towards a Competitive Company Law, 19 COMPANY LAW. 134, 138
(1998).  The prospect of legislative intervention has been present since the Cadbury Report was
issued.  The Cadbury Committee stated explicitly that if companies did not act in accordance
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1998 discussion paper that legislative reform concerning corporate
governance could be expected to take place “where experience shows
that some legal underpinning is needed.”129  For example, the DTI
mentioned that shareholders might be compelled by statute to take a
more active role at general meetings and might be given increased
supervisory jurisdiction over executive pay.130
Another issue that can be expected to receive attention in the
aftermath of the work done by the Cadbury, Hampel, and Greenbury
Committees is the structure of the board of directors.  In British
companies, the board is a unitary institution and, strictly speaking, all
directors bear equal responsibility for direction of the company.131
This framework poses problems for outside directors if they concern
themselves primarily with monitoring and supervising management.
Under such circumstances, they will be acting as watchdogs at the
same time that their participation in corporate decision-making leads
them to identify with management’s decisions and view the executive
directors as colleagues.132
The difficulties non-executives face within a unitary board
structure may be solved by the adoption of the two-tier model public
companies used in Germany and some other countries.133  In such
firms, the board is divided explicitly into supervisory and
management components and there is a clear delineation of the tasks
that executive and non-executive directors are expected to perform.134
with its Code, legislation and other external regulation would likely be proposed as a solution to
the problems the Committee had sought to address.  See CADBURY REPORT, supra note 1, ¶
1.10.
129. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 10.
130. See id. at 11.  The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry made suggestions of a
similar nature with respect to executive pay in 1999.  See Stephen Byers, Principles of
Greenbury and Hampel Apply to Pay Issue (letter to the editor), FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at
14; Jane Martinson, Minister Warns Over Executive Remuneration, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1999, at
11.
131. See discussion supra note 30 (explaining that all directors have the same duties and
responsibilities under English law).
132. See CHARKHAM, supra note 43, at 272-73; James D. Cox & N. Clausen, The Monitoring
Duties of Directors Under the EC Directives: A View from the United States Experience, 2 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 29, 47-48 (1992).
133. Some in the United Kingdom have recommended that such a change be made.  See
THOMAS SHERIDAN & NIGEL KENDALL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ACTION PLAN FOR
PROFITABILITY AND BUSINESS SUCCESS 107-8, 161-62 (1992); John Parkinson, Company Law
and Stakeholder Governance, in STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM 142, 152-54 (G. Kelly et al. eds.,
1997).
134. See Wymeersch, supra note 37, at 1134-48 (discussing the two-tier system in Germany
and in other countries).
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Adoption of such a system in Britain would eliminate ambiguities
concerning the status of a company’s outside directors because they
would be members of the supervisory board and would not interact in
any sort of continuous fashion with the company’s management team.
The Hampel Committee was aware of the debate concerning the
merits of a unitary board structure and therefore took the
opportunity to review opinions of its two-tiered counterpart.135  The
Committee found overwhelming support for the unitary board and
little enthusiasm for the two-tier framework and, therefore, did not
recommend any changes.136  It is unlikely, however, that this will be
the last word on the issue.  The European Union currently has a
proposed company law directive that, if adopted, will give member
states the option to adopt a two-tiered structure.137  At this point, the
proposal is effectively dormant, but if the situation changes, debate
about the merits of the two-tier system will arise again.138
Similarly, the position that various constituencies have in relation
to companies is an issue likely to attract future attention.  The classic
view under U.K. company law is that a company should be run for the
benefit of the owners of the company, namely, the shareholders.139  A
competing view is that other constituencies affected by corporate
activity deserve recognition.  Employees, suppliers, customers, and
even society at large have been identified as interest groups with an
important “stake” in companies.140  However, the Cadbury,
Greenbury, and Hampel Committees paid little attention to the
“stakeholder” model of the company.  Instead, the panels equated a
135. On the intentions of the Hampel Committee in this regard, see William Lewis, Guide to
the Great “Untouchables,” FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 12.  The Cadbury Committee assumed
without reviewing the issue that the board should remain a unitary structure.  See CADBURY
REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 1.8.
136. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 3.12.
137. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, THE FIFTH COMPANY LAW DIRECTIVE:
AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A FIFTH DIRECTIVE ON THE HARMONISATION OF COMPANY LAW
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ¶ 8 (Jan. 1990).  There have been various drafts of this
measure.  The latest, which was circulated by the European Commission in 1988, is appended to
this consultative document issued by the Department of Trade & Industry.
138. On the current status of the Fifth Directive, see LAW COMMISSION AND SCOTTISH
LAW COMMISSION, COMPANY DIRECTORS: REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AND
FORMULATING A STATEMENT OF DUTIES 19 (Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 153;
Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 105, 1998).
139. See PARKINSON, supra note 48, at 81-88 (also discussing how the “classic” view has
been modified by statute and case law in the United Kingdom).
140. See, e.g, Parkinson, supra note 133, at 148-52; Fiona M. Patfield, Challenges for
Company Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW: 1, 10-14 (Fiona M. Patfield ed. 1995).
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company’s interests with those of its shareholders, and the
recommendations they offered were framed accordingly.141
The failure of the Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel Committees
to address stakeholder issues provoked disapproval in some circles.
According to the critics, the committees missed an ideal opportunity
to evaluate managerial accountability in its proper context and to
recommend truly meaningful corporate governance reform.142  As part
of its current review of core company law, however, the Department
of Trade and Industry has taken steps that should please those
disappointed with the Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel Reports.
The DTI said when it launched the review in 1998 that it wanted to
open for discussion fundamental issues concerning the model of
company which society wants to adopt.143  A steering group
responsible for orchestrating the DTI’s company law review followed
up when it issued a consultation document in 1999.144  This
consultation document assessed whether directors should be
encouraged to adopt a “pluralist” approach when running companies,
rather than catering solely to shareholders.  The steering group also
discussed changes that could be made to the law to implement the
pluralist model.  These included compelling directors to have due
regard for social and ethical objectives, altering the composition of
company boards to ensure that “stakeholders” have suitable
representation and requiring companies to issue a report on relations
with employees, suppliers, customers, and the community.145
141. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1.16-1.18; Barnard, supra note 6, at 112;
SMERDON, supra note 30, at 10-12; George Pitcher, Like it or Not, Shareholders Will Always
Rule the Corporate Roost, MARKETING WK., Aug. 7, 1997, at 23; Alan Dignam, A Principled
Approach to Self-Regulation?  The Report of the Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance,
19 CO. LAW. 140, 141-42 (1998).
142. See Boyd, supra note 59, at 177; Dignam, supra note 141, at 142, 153; C.A. Riley,
Whither UK Corporate Governance?, AMICUS CURIAE, Oct. 1997, at 16; Jennie Walsh, Hampel
Blasted for Failing to Tackle Old-Boy Culture, PEOPLE MGMT., Feb. 5, 1998, at 16.
143. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 10.  For further
discussion of the implications of the points the DTI has raised, see Pettet, supra note 128, at 140;
Janet Dine, The Comprehensive Review of Company Law: Consultative Document, 19 CO. LAW.
82, 83 (1998).
144. See COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY § 5.1 (1999).
145. See id. §§ 5.1.30-5.1.33, 5.1.46-5.1.47, 5.1.50.
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VIII.  THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATE IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND ITS RELEVANCE ELSEWHERE:
THE ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE
The Hampel Report acknowledged that while corporate
structures and governance arrangements vary widely from country to
country, the underlying issues of managerial accountability are the
same everywhere.146  It would seem to follow that the debate over
corporate governance that has taken place in the United Kingdom is
directly relevant for those in other countries who are interested in
managerial accountability and related topics.  It is unlikely, however,
that this is the correct inference to draw.  Since the “arms-length” or
“outsider” system of ownership and control that prevails in the
United Kingdom is uncommon elsewhere,147 the corporate
governance issues that matter most in other countries tend to be of a
different character than in Britain.  This point can be illustrated by
considering the situation in Italy. 148
In Britain, large companies are usually publicly quoted, public
companies have widely diffused share ownership, equity markets are
well developed, and institutional investors participate extensively in
these equity markets.  By contrast, in Italy, the majority of large
business enterprises are not quoted on the Milan stock exchange.149
Instead, most Italian companies have shied away from carrying out
public offerings and are privately held.150  Moreover, Italy’s equity
market is underdeveloped relative to the state of the economy,151 and
146. See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 1.4.
147. See discussion supra notes 11 and 37 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra
note 158.
148. See Lorenzo Stanghellini, Corporate Governance in Italy: Strong Owners, Faithful
Managers: An Assessment and a Proposal for Reform, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 91, 99, 155-
65, 183-85 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey, Italian Corporate Governance: An American Perspective,
1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 141-44.  Others who have considered corporate governance
issues from a comparative perspective have made the same point on a more general level.  See,
e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 39, at 739, 769-71; La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 27-31;
Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 502-5, 511-12 (1998); Marco Becht,
Strong Blockholders, Weak Owners and the Need for European Mandatory Disclosure, in THE
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: A SURVEY OF 7 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
(PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION) 1, 10-14, 21-25 (1997).
149. See Moerland, supra note 35, at 21.
150. See La Porta et al., supra note 36, at 1131.
151. See id.; Eugenio Ruggiero, Italy, in THE LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS 79, 81-82 (Arthur R. Pinto & Gustavo Visentini eds.,
1998); Marco Pagano et al., Why Do Companies Go Public?  An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. FIN.
27, 28 (1998).
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institutional investors “have so far been the great absentee in the
Italian stock market.”152
Those Italian companies that are quoted on the stock market
generally have highly consolidated control structures.153  Frequently,
such enterprises are majority owned by a single shareholder.154  Many
other quoted firms form part of a multi-company group established
by way of an elaborate cross-shareholding scheme.155  This ownership
structure ensures that control ultimately rests in the hands of one
party or a closely allied set of investors, such as a family.156
Ultimately, powerful families, together with the Italian state,
dominate the country’s public companies.157  This pattern means that
Italy shares an “insider” or “control-oriented” system of ownership
and control with most of its neighbors in continental Europe.158
Since there is a highly concentrated distribution of equity in
Italian business, the corporate governance issues that are of primary
importance in the “outsider/arms-length” system in the United
Kingdom are of limited relevance in Italy.  As we have seen, in a
publicly quoted company without a controlling shareholder, those
owning equity should be fearful of “agency costs” arising from self-
serving managerial conduct.159  Investors in this type of company
should therefore be supportive of initiatives designed to induce
152. Stanghellini, supra note 148, at 145; see also Berglöf, supra note 4, at 102; Luca
Enriques, The Law on Corporate Directors’ Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analysis, SOC. SCI.
RES. NETWORK J. 1, 10 (Oct. 1998) <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=1356
74>.
153. See Wymeersch, supra note 37, at 1164-66; Stanghellini, supra note 148, at 136;
Marcello Bianchi et al., Ownership, Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership
and Control, in 3 THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: A SURVEY OF 7
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION) 1, 18
(1997) <http://www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/ecgn/euprelimreport.htm#Report>.
154. See Wymeersch, supra note 37, at 1164-66; Ruggerio, supra note 151, at 84-86; Bianchi
et al., supra note 153, at 18-19; Gian B. Bruni, The New Consolidated Act on Companies Listed
on the Italian Stock Exchange, 13 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT. BANKING & FIN. L. 416, 417 (1998).
155. See Berglöf, supra note 4, at 102; Macey, supra note 148, at 134-35; Bianchi et al., supra
note 153, at 24-27.
156. See Macey, supra note 148, at 135; Stanghellini, supra note 148, at 138-40; Ruggerio,
supra note 151, at 82, 100.
157. See La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 492-93 tbl.2-3; Bianchi et al., supra note 153, at 2;
Alessandro Zattoni, The Structure of Corporate Groups: The Italian Case, 7 CORP.
GOVERNANCE—AN INT’L REV. 38, 39-45 (1999); John Glover, The End of “Spaghetti”
Governance, INSTITUTIONAL INV., July 1996, at 30.
158. See Berglöf, supra note 42, at 155-63.  While there are similarities between Italy and
other Continental European countries, there are also important differences.  See, e.g., JOHN
SCOTT, CORPORATE BUSINESS AND CAPITALIST CLASSES, ch. 6, 142-203 (3d ed. 1997).
159. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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executives to act in shareholders’ interests, such as aligning executive
pay with performance and ensuring that the board of directors
supervises management properly.160
Companies with a dominant shareholder are different.
Managerial fidelity seems unlikely to pose a serious problem.
Controlling shareholders are likely to have a financial stake large
enough to motivate them to keep a careful watch on corporate
management.161  They should additionally have sufficient influence to
orchestrate the removal of disloyal or ineffective managers.162  Again,
enhancing managerial accountability was a primary goal of the
Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel Committees.  Given the highly
consolidated control of Italy’s public companies, this should not be a
matter of great urgency in an Italian context.
While self-serving managerial conduct is unlikely to be a serious
concern when a company has a dominant shareholder, difficulties of a
different character may arise.163  There is a real danger that
controlling shareholders will collude with management to cheat other
equity owners.164  This might be done in several ways.165  For instance,
a controlling shareholder might arrange to purchase additional shares
on favorable terms not otherwise made available.166  Alternately, the
controller could engineer “sweetheart” deals with related
corporations in order to siphon off a disproportionate share of the
160. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
161. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 39, at 739, 754; Macey, supra note 148, at 142; Ronald
J. Daniels & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Toward a Distinctive Corporate Law Regime, 29 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 863, 884-85 (1991).
162. See Becht, supra note 148, at 23; Daniels & MacIntosh, supra note 161, at 885; Ronald
J. Daniels & Randall Morck, Canadian Corporate Governance: The Challenge, in CORPORATE
DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA, supra note 39, at 12.  For empirical evidence from Germany
which demonstrates the point, see GOERGEN, supra note 42, at 57-64, 68-69.
163. See Berglöf, supra note 4, at 97; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 39, at 758-60; Becht,
supra note 148, at 23-24. The point has also been raised in the Italian context.  See Ruggerio,
supra note 151, at 88; Bruni, supra note 154, at 417.  Similar views are expressed in a 1999 report
issued by the Borsa Italiana S.p.A’s Committee for the Corporate Governance of Listed
Companies.  See Borsa Italiana S.p.A’s Committee for the Corporate Governance of Listed
Companies, Code of Conduct 21 (Oct. 1999) <http://www.borsaitalia.it/ing/news/CodeofConduct
.pdf> (Italian version available at < http://www.borsaitalia.it/ita/news/CodicediAutodisciplina.
pdf.>.
164. See Berglöf, supra note 4, at 120 (response and commentary by Alisa A. Röell).
165. See Jeffrey G. MacIntosh & Lawrence P. Schwartz, Do Institutional and Controlling
Shareholders Increase Corporate Value?, in CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA, supra
note 39, at 303, 308-09.
166. See Deborah A. DeMott, Agency Principles and Large Block Shareholders, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 321, 333-34 (1997).
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public company’s earnings.167  Minority shareholders can also be
prejudiced if companies are dominated by entrepreneurs who,
motivated by vanity, sentiment, or loyalty, continue to run the
business when no longer suited to do so or transfer control to family
members ill-prepared for the job.168
Since Italy’s “insider” or “control-oriented” system of ownership
and control poses serious risks for minority shareholders, providing
suitable protection for such investors should, at least for the time
being, be a higher priority than fostering managerial accountability.
Consistent with this line of thinking, minority shareholder protection
has recently been the subject of attention in Italy.  Many hold the
view that Italian corporate law leaves those who control a company
pretty much free to act as they wish and does little to protect the
minority from opportunistic and self-serving conduct.169  In 1998, the
Italian Government responded to such concerns by making a number
of changes to the legal regime governing companies.170  For example,
an Italian public company (Societa per Azioni) is required to have a
supervisory board of internal auditors (collegio sindacle), and
minority shareholders now have the right to representation in this
body.  Furthermore, minority shareholders now have the right to
force management to hold a shareholder meeting and to use
allegations of serious irregularities to obtain a court order for the
inspection of a company’s affairs.171  While individual shareholders in
Italian companies traditionally have not been able to bring a
derivative suit against directors, now a minority representing at least
five percent of the issued capital of a listed company may do so.172
167. See Daniels & MacIntosh, supra note 161, at 885.
168. See Daniels & Morck, supra note 162, at 13; Ronald J. Daniels & Paul Halpern, Too
Close for Comfort: The Role of the Closely Held Public Corporation in the Canadian Economy
and the Implications for Public Policy, 26 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 11, 17, 20-21 (1996).
169. See Macey, supra note 148, at 129-34, 140.
170. See Law n. 58 of Feb. 24, 1998 (Gazz. Uff. n. 71, Mar. 26, 1998, Supp. Ord. n. 52) (It.).
For an English-language overview of the changes made, see generally Marcello Bianchi et al.,
Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy, 1, 8-9 (Oct.
1998) <http://www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/newpapers>; Bruni, supra note 154, at 417; Ruggerio, supra
note 151, at 108-10; Centre for Law and Business, University of Manchester, Company Law in
Europe: Recent Developments, 1, 41-42 (last modified Feb. 1999) <www.dti.gov.uk/
cld/milman.pdf>; Giuseppe Scassellati-Sforzolini & Pietro Fioruzzi, Italy, INT’L FIN. L. REV. 35,
35 (Supp. Apr. 1998).
171. See Bianchi et al., supra note 170, at 8-9.  On the law prior to the 1998 reforms, see
Massimo Audisio, Italy, in PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 125, 128-30 (Matthais
W. Stecher ed., 1997).
172. See Bianchi et al., supra note 170.  On the pre-1998 position, see Stanghellini, supra
note 148, at 123, 169-71; Audisio, supra note 171, at 132-33.
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It is unlikely that the changes made by the Italian government in
1998 will end debate concerning protection of minority shareholders.
One reason is that the reform carried out could have been more
ambitious in nature.  For instance, while allowing minority
shareholders to pursue derivative litigation was one of the more
important innovations of 1998, the five percent limitation may be too
high to allow this procedure to be an effective tool for minority
shareholders in publicly quoted companies.  This is because most
investors in such firms will not own enough shares to meet the
relevant threshold.173
Another reason that protection of minority shareholders will
remain on the agenda is that Italian companies, like their
counterparts throughout continental Europe, are becoming
increasingly eager to obtain financing through equity markets.174
Since a company that is attractive to investors will be well positioned
to make a successful entry to the stock market and to carry out
subsequent public offerings of shares, firms making a move towards
public ownership face pressure to respond to the concerns of the
financial markets.175  If a company planning to offer shares to the
public is going to have a controlling shareholder, potential investors
will likely fear that they will be victims of schemes designed to cheat
the minority.  Because such concerns will exist, if Italian companies
are going to rely more heavily on the stock market as a source of
financing, they will need to give careful thought to the protection of
minority shareholders.176
If the trend toward public ownership becomes sufficiently strong
in Italy, controlling shareholders could fade away as part of a shift
toward the “outsider/arm’s-length” system of ownership and control
that exists in the United Kingdom and the United States.177  Such
changes, however, seem unlikely to occur in Italy, at least in the short
173. See Bianchi et al., supra note 170, at 9; Ruggerio, supra note 151, at 109.  On the case
for reform generally, see Stanghellini, supra note 148, at 181.
174. On Europe, see Stefan Wagstyl, Crumbs from the Table, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at
27; Going for the Golden Egg, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1996, at 89; John C. Coffee, The Future as
History: Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 641, 664-67 (1999).  On Italy, see John C. Coffee, supra; Glover, supra note 157;
Stanghellini, supra note 148, at 164-65.
175. See Brian R. Cheffins, UK Football Clubs and the Stock Market: Past Developments and
Future Prospects: Part 1, 18 CO. LAW. 66, 74 (1997).  For anecdotal evidence illustrating the
point in an Italian context, see Glover, supra note 157.
176. See Stanghellini, supra note 148, at 165.  See generally Glover, supra note 157; Leslie
Kramer, Too Little, Too Late?, INSTITUTIONAL INV., Apr. 1998, at 137.
177. See Kissane, supra note 5, at 625, 672-73.
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term.178  A more plausible scenario is that public ownership will
become increasingly prevalent but that controlling shareholders will
continue to play a dominant role.179  If this is correct, minority
shareholder protection is a topic that is likely to receive attention for
some time to come.180
IX.  THE TREATMENT OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN
CANADA
The Canadian situation can give a sense of the possible direction
for debate concerning the protection of minority shareholders in
public companies.  As in the United Kingdom and the United States,
Canadian businesses are commonly publicly quoted.  Also, the
country has a number of well-established stock exchanges, the largest
and best known being in Toronto.181  At the same time, however, an
important feature distinguishes the Canadian equity market from its
counterparts in Britain and the United States.  In the United
Kingdom and the United States, ownership in publicly quoted
companies is widely dispersed because large shareholdings, especially
majority ownership, are uncommon.182  By contrast, in Canada, more
than seven out of ten public corporations are either under legal
control (one shareholder or a small affiliated group owns more than
50% of the voting shares) or effective control (one shareholder or a
small affiliated group owns between 20 and 50% of the equity).183
178. See Wagstyl, supra note 174; Zattoni, supra note 157, at 46-47; Paul Betts, Italy’s Grand
Old Men Seek Professional Help, FIN. POST (Canada), Jan. 27, 1998, at 17.
179. The experience with initial public offerings involving German companies is potentially
instructive; on this, see GOERGEN, supra note 42, at 46-50, 69, 80-83, 103-05.
180. See Stanghellini, supra note 148, at 181.  See also Coffee, supra note 174, at 658-59, 673-
76 (arguing that minority protection will arise in European companies because these companies
will opt to issue shares in the United States and thereby become subject to “minority friendly”
United States securities laws).  See generally Erik Berglöf, Company Reforms Must Shed More
Light, INDEP. (London), Aug. 10, 1997, at B5; Comic Opera, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 1997, at 54,
55.
181. On Toronto’s situation, see Spotlight on Toronto, supra note 13.  As a result of a
reorganization carried out in 1999, the Toronto Stock Exchange operates as the sole seior
equities market for Canada.  The Canadian Venture Exchange offers trading for small-
capitalization companies and the Montreal Exchange offers trading in small capitalization
Quebec-based companies and is Canada’s market for derivative products.  For further details,
see TSE Welcomes Companies from the Montreal Exchange, TSE NEWS RELEASE (Toronto
Stock Exchange), Dec. 6, 1999, <http://www.tse.com/cgi-bin/uni_framset.cgi?content%3Dnews/
press.html>.
182. See supra notes 38 and 39 and accompanying text.
183. See Daniels & MacIntosh, supra note 161, at 884 (setting out definitions of “legal
control” and “effective control”); Randall K. Morck, On the Economics of Concentrated
Ownership, 26 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 63, 69 (1996); Kathryn E. Montgomery, Market Shift—The
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Canada is therefore in the position Italy could soon occupy: public
ownership of companies is prevalent but controlling shareholders
remain an important presence.184
As mentioned, in companies with a concentrated ownership
structure, there is a real danger that the dominant shareholder will
collude with management to cheat others who own equity in the
company.185  In Canada, however, “the position of minority
shareholders has received sympathetic attention from legislators,
regulators[,] . . . and courts,” and disgruntled investors have a wide
range of remedies potentially available to them.186  For example,
securities regulation offers one source of protection.187  Because
Ontario is the country’s largest province, most Canadian public
corporations distribute shares to Ontario citizens and thus fall under
the jurisdiction of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).  The
OSC regulates various transactions made by public companies in
which the majority may benefit at the expense of the minority.  For
instance, the OSC seeks to ensure that bids to acquire control of a
corporation are structured in a manner that is “fair and which is
perceived to be fair.”188  Also, OSC rules stipulate that when there is a
major transaction between a corporation and a related party (such as
a controlling shareholder), the relevant details of the transaction must
be disclosed to all investors, the transaction should be scrutinized by a
committee of non-executive directors, and the transaction must be
approved by a majority of disinterested shareholders.189
Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 26 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 189, 194
(1996).
184. There are other countries which fall into this pattern.  See, e.g., STAPLEDON, supra note
57, at 4-5; Ian M. Ramsay & Mark Blair, Ownership Concentration, Institutional Investment and
Corporate Governance: An Empirical Investigation of 100 Australian Companies, 19
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 153, 165-71 (1993) (discussing Australia); John C. Coffee, Liquidity
Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1306-
8 (1991) (discussing Sweden).
185. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
186. Philip Anisman, The Commission as Protector of Minority Shareholders, in LSUC
SPECIAL LECTURES 451, 451 (1989) [hereinafter The Commission].  The range of legal remedies
available to minority shareholders was expanded substantially in the 1970s and 1980s.  On the
history of this expansion, see Philip Anisman, Majority-Minority Relations in Canadian
Corporate Law: An Overview, 12 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 473 (1987).
187. See generally The Commission, supra note 186.
188. Ontario Securities Commission Policy No. 9.1, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 471-901, at
§ 1.1 (June 26, 1992).  See also Ontario Securities Commission Policy No. 9.1, Can. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶¶ 471-901, at §§ 4-11 (June 26, 1992); The Commission, supra note 186, at 464-73.
189. See Ontario Securities Commission Policy No. 9.1, Part V, 1994 Can. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶¶ 471-901.
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Minority shareholders in Canadian public companies are also
entitled to rely on a variety of remedies set out in corporations law.
Most businesses in the country are incorporated under a federal
statute known as the Canadian Business Corporations Act (CBCA)
or provincial laws modeled after the CBCA.190  Under the CBCA,
regardless of the percentage of shares a shareholder owns, if
prescribed criteria are met, he or she can obtain leave from a court to
pursue a derivative action.191  Shareholders also have “appraisal”
rights that allow them to vote on specified fundamental changes that
management might propose.  In the event that such changes are
implemented against their wishes, individual shareholders can
demand the corporation to buy out their stock at fair value.192
Moreover, a shareholder can apply for relief on the grounds that the
affairs of the corporation are being conducted in a manner that is
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to him or her.193  Finally, all shares
of a class are entitled to vote separately as a class on changes that will
affect the class differently from the ways that shares of other classes
will be affected.194
Though the concentrated nature of share ownership in Canadian
public companies means that protection of minority shareholders is a
legitimate concern, it is uncertain whether the current legal regime
operates in an ideal manner.  For example, some fear that there is a
counterproductive bias in favor of those owning a minority stake.  A
possible danger is that minority shareholders will use their leverage to
hold out for a disproportionate share of the spoils, thereby deterring
corporations from carrying out desirable fundamental changes.195  A
190. See generally Canadian Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44 (1985) (Can.).  Six
of Canada’s ten provinces—Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick and
Newfoundland—have legislation based on the CBCA.  On incorporation percentages and
differences between the various statutes, see Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete?
The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130, 152-54, 157-58 (1991).
191. See R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 239 (1985) (Can.).  Before granting leave under this measure, a
judge must be satisfied that the shareholder has given reasonable notice of his or her intentions
to the corporation’s directors, that the shareholder who is applying is acting in good faith and
that it appears to be in the interests of the corporation that the action be brought.  See id. §
239(2).
192. See id. § 190.
193. See id. § 241.  For examples of cases where this remedy has been used by minority
shareholders in public companies, see Palmer v. Carling O’Keefe Breweries of Canada Ltd.
[1989] 67 O.R.2d 161 and Westfair Foods v. Watt [1991] 79 D.L.R. 48.
194. See R.S.C., ch. C-44 § 176 (1985) (Can.).
195. See Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Minority Shareholder Rights in Canada and England: 1860-
1987,  27 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 561, 564-65, 644-45 (1989).
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similar concern is that there are too many instruments in the minority
shareholders’ arsenal, allegedly engendering overlap and confusion.196
While it is not clear whether Canadians have struck the correct
balance with respect to protection of minority shareholders, Italian
lawmakers and securities regulators may well benefit from examining
the Canadian system of corporate governance.  Canada is a country
where equity markets are well developed, but many quoted
companies are controlled by one shareholder or an affiliated group of
investors.  Since Italy may soon end up in the same situation, the
Canadian response to the problem of abuse by dominant
shareholders may prove instructive to Italian policymakers as they
evaluate their country’s system of corporate governance.
X.  CONCLUSION
When a country such as Italy has an “insider” or “control-
oriented” system of ownership and control, providing suitable
protection for minority shareholders should be a higher priority than
fostering managerial accountability.  This does not mean, however,
that the debate over corporate governance that has taken place in the
United Kingdom is irrelevant.  If there is a strong move towards the
stock market in a jurisdiction where control of companies has
traditionally been highly consolidated, there ultimately could be a
shift toward the “outsider/arm’s-length” system of ownership and
control that exists in the United Kingdom and the United States.
Under such circumstances, executives would have greater scope to
impose agency costs on shareholders than was formerly the case.
Adoption of proposals endorsed by the Cadbury, Greenbury, and
Hampel Committees, such as providing outside directors with a
prominent role, using executive service contracts to link pay with
performance, and fostering institutional investor activism, stand out
as potentially attractive solutions to the “agency cost” problem.
Even if a move toward the stock market does not cause a
country’s “insider” or “control-oriented” system of ownership and
control to fade away, reforms being discussed and implemented in
Britain are still potentially relevant.  In the United Kingdom, an
important corporate governance theme has been that non-executive
directors and institutional shareholders should play a constructive
role by monitoring executive performance.  It is possible that they can
196. See Ronald J. Daniels & Randall Morck, Canadian Corporate Governance: Policy
Options, in CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA, supra note 39, at 661, 675-76.
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also offer protection to minority shareholders by acting in a
supervisory capacity.
Consider first outside directors.  Through active vigilance, they
might be able to deter a dominant shareholder from carrying out
unfair self-dealing transactions or from implementing ill-conceived
executive succession strategies. 197  Italian lawmakers have been
thinking along such lines, since in 1998 the country’s corporate law
was amended to ensure that outside shareholders have representation
on the supervisory board of internal auditors.198
Institutional shareholders may also be able to play a useful
disciplinary role in a company that has a controlling shareholder. 199
Since the financial institutions will only own a minority of the shares,
they will not be able to exercise influence by passing resolutions at
shareholder meetings.  Still, they should have potentially significant
leverage.  This is because they will be important prospective buyers of
shares in future public offerings and because they are likely to have
sufficient access to the media to ensure that their misgivings are
reported widely in the business press.
The Canadian experience illustrates that the analysis of non-
executive directors and institutional shareholders carried out in
Britain is relevant in a country where public companies are typically
controlled by one shareholder or an affiliated group of investors.  In a
1994 report, the Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate
Governance dealt with several themes that have been important in
the United Kingdom (such as non-executive directors and internal
financial controls) and acknowledged the value of the Cadbury
Committee’s findings.200  The following year, in order to implement
the report’s recommendations, the Toronto Stock Exchange amended
197. See Daniels & Halpern, supra note 168, at 59; see also HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 1,
¶ 3.10.
198. See supra note 170 and related discussion; cf. Borsa Italiana, supra note 163, at 18-19,
21 (discussing the role outside directors can play when conflicts of interest exist between the
interests of the company and the controlling shareholders).
199. See MacIntosh & Schwartz, supra note 165, at 313, 330; Jeffrey G. MacIntosh,
Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in Canada, 26 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 145,
174 (1996); e.g., Telecom Italia Scuttles its Split-Off of Wireless Unit, Bowing to Pressure, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at A18 (describing the role institutional investors played in halting a
transaction proposed by the majority shareholder of Telecom Italia that was highly unpopular
with the company’s minority shareholders).
200. Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada, “Where
Were the Directors?” Guidelines For Improved Corporate Governance in Canada, ¶ 3.18-3.20
(Dec. 1994).
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its requirements for maintaining a listing.201  The resulting scheme
resembled the system in the United Kingdom that had emerged as a
result of amendments made to the London Stock Exchange’s Yellow
Book to implement changes suggested by the Cadbury Report.202
While the Canadian experience indicates that the analysis of
corporate governance issues carried out in the United Kingdom is
potentially relevant in a country where controlling shareholders play
a prominent role, emulation of British reforms must be carried out
cautiously in countries with a different system of ownership and
control.  The changes introduced as a result of the work of the
Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel Committees were designed in
large measure to enhance managerial accountability.  In a country
like Italy, protection of minority shareholders is likely a more
pressing concern.
If policymakers in Italy and other countries with an
“insider/control-oriented” system of corporate governance seek
guidance concerning minority shareholder protection, the experience
in Canada deserves examination.  One reason is that minority
shareholders in Canada have a wide range of legal protections
available to them.  Also, countries with “insider/control-oriented”
systems of ownership and control may well be moving towards the
position which Canada currently occupies, this being one where
publicly traded companies are well-established but controlling
shareholders remain an important factor.  Since the Canadian
experience is potentially relevant for countries such as Italy, this
Article has drawn attention to circumstances existing in Toronto as
well as in London.
One can only speculate at this juncture whether specific
shareholder protection mechanisms operating in Canada will in fact
be suitable for companies listed on a stock market such as the one
based in Milan.  Still, it should be evident from what has been said
that the issue of minority shareholder protection will need to be high
on the agenda in a country like Italy.  This, in turn, serves to put in
perspective what countries can learn from the UK experience with
corporate governance.  Corporate governance should not be studied
in the isolation of a single country and the process by which Britain
has addressed managerial accountability issues may well “have a
201. See Toronto Stock Exchange Company Manual, 1 Can. Stock Ex. Man. (CCH) §§ 472-
75 (Feb. 1998); Toronto Stock Exchange General By-Law, 1 Can. Stock Ex. Man. (CCH) § 19.17
(Aug. 1997).
202. See Cheffins, supra note 2, at 97.
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singularly appealing character.”203  Nevertheless, for countries that
have a different system of ownership and control than Britain’s, the
experience of jurisdictions other than the United Kingdom should be
used to discover the norms that need adjustment in an increasingly
global market.
203. Barnard, supra note 6.
